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As the author of a column on forum selection in the National
Law Journal,' of four chapters on removal, venue, and multidistrict
litigation in Moore's Federal Practice,2 and of several monographs
and law review articles,3 I have focused on various aspects of the
competition between plaintiffs and defendants over whether they will
do battle over the merits of a litigation in state or federal court. The
focus of much of this writing has been on the often arcane rules of
federal jurisdiction that both sides need to know in order to be
successful in keeping the litigation in state court, as plaintiffs have
usually desired, or federal court, where defendants have generally
preferred to litigate.
What is forum shopping to some, is forum selection to others.
And, the stakes of the forum selection battle became greater as mass
litigation of various kinds, involving millions and even billons of
dollars, became the popular paradigm of modem litigation.4 Sparks
flew as plaintiffs filed massive nationwide class actions in state
. Professor of Law & William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. See, e.g., Georgene Vairo, CAFA Mass Action Primer, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 10, 2007, at 13.
2. See Georgene Vairo, Removal, in 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 107 (3d ed. 2007); Georgene Vairo, Determination of Proper Venue, in 17 MOORE
ET AL. supra 110; Georgene Vairo, Change of Venue, in 17 MOORE ET AL., supra, 111;
Georgene Vairo, Multidistrict Litigation, in 17 MOORE ET AL., supra, 112, [hereinafter
Multidistrict Litigation].
3. See, e.g., GEORGENE VAIRO, CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005: WITH
COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS (LexisNexis 2005) [hereinafter VAIRO, CAFA]; Georgene Vairo,
Judicial v. Congressional Federalism: The Implications of the New Federalism Decisions on
Mass Tort Cases and Other Complex Litigation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1559 (2000) [hereinafter
Federalism]; Georgene Vairo, Georgine, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and The Rhetoric of
Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79 (1997) [hereinafter Rhetoric].
4. VAIRO, CAFA, supra note 3, at 1-5.
764 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:763
courts that corporate defendants labeled "judicial hellholes."5
Congress responded to such defendants' pleas with the enactment of
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA").6 The purpose of
CAFA was political: steer state court class actions to federal court,
even if all claims asserted arise under state law.7
Why did defendants see federal courts as Nirvana? Beginning in
the 1980s, there were a number of procedural developments in the
federal courts that were seen, if not designed, as pro-defendant and
anti-plaintiff. First, in 1983, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was amended to hold lawyers to a higher standard of
practice in order to deter the filing of frivolous lawsuits.' At the
same time, and continuing through the early 2000s, Rule 16 and the
discovery rules were amended to enhance judicial control of
litigation in order to reduce costs and delay.9 Then, in 1986, the
Supreme Court decided its first trilogy of summary judgment cases,
making Rule 56 a far more potent tool to shortcut cases that may
have otherwise been on their way to a jury trial.1" Carrying this trend
further, the Supreme Court in the 1990's decided a second trilogy of
cases, making the federal district court judge the gatekeeper of expert
evidence to keep so-called "junk science" out of the system.1" Done
pre-trial, in connection with summary judgment motions, Daubert
hearings were perceived to be helping to eliminate the "hired gun"
5. Id. at 5.
6. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (2008).
7. Id. at 1-2.
8. GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND
PREVENTIVE MEASURES (3d ed. 2004).
9. Id. at 3-4.
10. See Georgene Vairo, Through the Prism: Summary Judgment and the Trilogy, in CIVIL
PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS II-F-I (5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
Through the Prism] (analyzing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 477
U.S. 574 (1986)).
11. In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Supreme Court undertook the
task of clarifying the standard for appellate review of summary judgments. The Court, in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), assessed the role expert
evidence should play in the context of summary judgment, holding that the district court is the
gatekeeper who must assess the admissibility of the proposed expert evidence. And in Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), the Court ruled that the Daubert gatekeeper role
applied to any proposed expert. See Through the Prism, supra note 10.
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expert. 2 All of these developments applied to any case in federal
court.
At the same time, there were other developments that led to the
enactment of CAFA. Beginning in the 1980s, the federal courts
began to use the multidistrict litigation statute 3 as a pre-trial tool to
consolidate complex lawsuits involving common questions of fact. 4
Simultaneously, federal district courts began to certify class actions
in more complex cases, such as mass tort cases. 5 And, these class
certifications were upheld at the appellate level. 6
Then the other shoe dropped. In 1997, in Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor,7 the United States Supreme Court issued a
restrictive class action opinion. The Court overturned a class action
settlement that would have essentially ended the asbestos litigation
that had been dragging on for decades. 8 Because class certification
in mass tort cases was thought to be unavailable in federal courts,
plaintiffs began to file in state courts.' 9 State court judges, many of
whom were relatively unfamiliar with complex litigation, issued so-
called "drive-by" class certifications." Some of these judges became
known for approving class actions or class action settlements that
would not be approved in federal court.2' Thus began the clamor for
legislation at the federal level to help corporate defendants get out of
12. Through the Prism, supra note 10.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2008).
14. See Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 2.
15. See Rhetoric, supra note 3, at 95-111.
16. Id.
17. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
18. Id. at 597-612.
19. See VAIRO, CAFA, supra note 3, at 2-3.
20. The former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court has highlighted the so-called
"drive-by" class action. See Mitchell v. H & R Block, Inc., 783 So. 2d 812, 818 (Ala. 2000)
(Hooper, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Alabama appears "intent upon remaining the poster child
for.., abuse of the judicial system [through] the 'drive-by' class certification"); see also Linda S.
Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother Sailing for Class
Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1715 (2000) (stating that the prevailing sense
among some practitioners is that in Gulf states "judges are more than willing to certify almost
anything that walks through the courtroom doors").
21. For example, in the GM side-saddle fuel tank litigation, after the United States Court of
Appeals struck down a class action settlement that had been approved by the district court, the
plaintiffs and defendant settled on similar terms in a state court. For a discussion of this
litigation, see Federalism, supra note 3, at 1602-03.
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such courts and into the federal courts, which were perceived to be
far more friendly to their interests.
President Bush signed CAFA into law on February 18, 2005,
and the act became effective that day. Ironically, however, many of
the states that had become known for harboring "judicial hellholes"
already had enacted legislation2 or their state Supreme Courts23 had
issued rulings that limited the viability of the cases being brought in
those jurisdictions. Additionally, there are important exceptions to
CAFA jurisdiction. Thus, CAFA did not end the role of state courts
in dealing with complex litigation.
CAFA allows for expanded federal diversity of class actions by
allowing for minimal diversity where there is an amount in
controversy in excess of $5 million.24 With minimal diversity, a
California plaintiff, for example, could not prevent federal
jurisdiction by naming an in-state defendant. But, CAFA is an
interesting jurisdictional statute. Even though Congress has made it
easy to acquire federal jurisdiction, the case may not remain in
federal court because CAFA provides for exceptions to the exercise
of jurisdiction. 5
Assume a class action is filed in California state court by a
plaintiff who is a California citizen. The class is composed of
California citizens as well as citizens of some other states. The
complaint names California defendants and out of state defendants as
well. Under CAFA, assuming the complaint alleges to a "legal
certainty" 26 that the amount in controversy is in excess of $5
million,27 there is federal jurisdiction over the case, and any
defendant may remove the case. 8 If, however, the plaintiff class
22. See, e.g., Lonny Hoffman, The Trilogy of 2003: Venue, Forum Non Conveniens and
Multidistrict Litigation, 24 ADVOC. 76 (2003) (describing 2003 amendments to Texas's
procedural rules).
23. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Byron, 876 N.E.2d 645 (Ill. 2007) (overturning
class action award of over $10 billion in light cigarette consumer class action).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2008).
25. Id. § 1332(d)(3)-(5).
26. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938) (explaining
that the amount in controversy is met unless there is no legal certainty that the plaintiff's claims
will meet the jurisdictional amount).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2008).
28. Id. § 1453 (providing special rules for removal of CAFA cases, including liberalizing the
general removal rules that all defendants must agree to removal and that no defendant may be a
citizen of the state in which the suit was brought). See VAIRO, CAFA, supra note 3, at 38-39.
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contains more than two-thirds California citizens, and certain other
requirements are met, the federal court is required to remand the
class action. 29 And, if between one-third and two-thirds of the class
are California citizens, the district court, after evaluating a number of
statutory factors, may decline jurisdiction over the case.3 ° Thus,
CAFA does not federalize all class actions.
Additionally, of course, not all lawsuits are class actions. With
the exception of "mass actions" of 100 or more plaintiffs that are
treated as class actions under CAFA,3" all other state-claim-based
litigation remains in state court, unless there is complete diversity
and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.12 Therefore, state
courts will remain active in class action and complex litigation.
This Developments issue focuses mainly on how California
courts deal with complex litigation. Additionally, it surveys how a
number of other state courts deal with complex litigation. To bring
alive the importance of what California and other state courts are
doing, I will introduce the five student articles with hypotheticals to
survey the problems this Developments issue will tackle.
II. CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LAW
As mentioned above, CAFA leaves room for state court class
actions with classes composed primarily of in-state plaintiffs. It is
important, then, to take a more careful look at how state court class
action rules work in the context of a case that might otherwise be
removed to or filed in federal court. What are the class action rules
of the state? How are they interpreted? What other procedural
provisions might apply in a state court class action?
California has a well developed and evolving body of statutes
and case law that provide a good illustration of how states, in
contrast to federal courts, handle class actions. To preview
California law on class actions, consider a typical consumer class
action litigation:
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) (2008).
30. Id. § 1332(d)(3).
31. Id. § 1332(d)(1 1).
32. Id. § 1332(a), see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 558-59,
566-67 (2005) (holding that as long as one plaintiff meets the jurisdictional amount,
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 supports jurisdiction over the claims that do not
meet the S75,000 jurisdictional amount).
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Suppose, for example, that Western Cooperative Bank
("Western") conducted an advertising campaign in 1999 to
highlight that its customers would not have to pay any
ATM fees even if customers used the ATMs of rival banks.
The program seemed to be successful in retaining
customers who routinely complained about the lack of
Western ATMs. In 2002, however, Western's board
members decided that the increased costs being passed on
to them by rival banks made the continuation of the "no
fee" program impossible. Therefore, Western began
passing along part of the fees from rival banks to their
customers.
Most customers did not notice the small charges that
ranged from $0.05 to $1.35 per transaction. But one
customer, Brad Johnson, was exceptionally frustrated by
the charges and showed the charges to his attorney, Emily
Solomon. Solomon was an experienced class action lawyer
and saw an opportunity to remedy what she believed was a
violation of state law. According to her estimates, the total
amount charged to customers could reach into the millions
of dollars, even though each customer's personal recovery
would not make individual adjudication viable.
Accordingly, Solomon filed a class action complaint
against Western on behalf of Johnson. In drafting the
complaint, she asserted claims pursuant to three different
California class action devices: California Code of Civil
Procedure ("CCP") section 382 (the primary statute that
authorizes class actions), the Consumer Legal Remedies
Act ("CLRA") (an alternative mechanism for class action
claims involving unfair consumer transactions), and the
Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") (which, until 2004,
provided for representative actions seeking equitable relief
for illegal, fraudulent, or unfair business practices). In the
complaint, Johnson sought compensatory damages, punitive
damages, and injunctive relief for Western's actions on
behalf of himself and other similarly situated customers.
The case, filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, California, was assigned to a judge who is part of
the state's complex court system, which provides certain
FOREWORD
judges additional training and resources to handle complex
litigation.
Western believes that a notice it provided its customers
immunizes it from any alleged wrongdoing. The bank
believes that California courts can be very pro-plaintiff
when it comes to high-profile class action cases and wants
the case to be adjudicated in federal court. In order to do
so, Western would have to remove the case, invoking
federal jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness
Act. While Western's counsel is very familiar with the
judge and believes the client would receive equitable
treatment, she feels that federal courts are generally more
"defendant friendly." Should Western's counsel remove to
federal court under CAFA in order to take advantage of
Federal Rule 23(f)? Is California class action procedure
slanted in favor of plaintiffs when it comes to class
adjudication?
The first article in this Developments issue explores these
questions.33 Specifically, William R. Shafton's article surveys the
evolution of the California class action devices and compares them to
Rule 23. Consumer class actions are precisely the sort of class
actions that prompted the enactment of CAFA. Small individual
damages with huge aggregate exposure for defendants gave rise to
the claims of legalized blackmail and "judicial hellholes. 34
Accordingly, understanding what differences there might be between
California practice and federal practice is critical. If plaintiffs
believe that it is more likely that a class will be certified under
California's rules, they ought to consider proposing a class that
consists mainly of California citizens. With such a proposed class, if
Western removes the case under CAFA, it will be returned to
33. William R. Shafton, Developments, California's Uncommon Common Law Class Action
Litigation, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 783 (2008).
34. Class actions have provoked controversy in a multitude of contexts. Compare Arthur R.
Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action
Problem," 92 HARV. L. REv. 664 (1979) (defending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 against
those who would limit its scope and applicability and arguing that much of the hostility against
this rule is based on misperceptions), with William Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine
of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 375 (1973) (finding that terms such as "legalized blackmail" have
a legitimate basis in areas such as class action damage suits under Federal antitrust and securities
law).
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California state court under CAFA's mandatory remand provision,
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4).35
III. NON-CLASS COMPLEX LITIGATION IN CALIFORNIA
Given the jurisdictional reach of CAFA, there is no question that
there will be many class actions filed in California that will remain in
federal court. 36  More importantly, class actions are not the only
game in town. The wrongful conduct by a defendant or a few
defendants may cause grievous harm to one or a few individual or
corporate plaintiffs. Additionally, even if a dispute appears to be a
relatively simple two party litigation, it can become complex through
the ability of defendants to assert claims against the plaintiff,37 the
ability to cross-claim against co-parties, 38 and the ability to add third
parties pursuant to California's joinder rules39-especially if the
dispute involves a substantial sum. When the dollar amount sought
is great, when discovery will be difficult, and/or when the legal
issues and application of the law to the facts will be complicated, the
case can be complex even when no class claims are alleged, all the
parties are citizens of California, or there is not complete diversity.
The next article, by Scott Paetty, focuses on this type of litigation
and how California deals with it.4"
The following hypothetical provides a vehicle for looking at the
various techniques California and its courts have developed to deal
with a complex litigation:
After toiling in Hollywood for over a decade, Joe
Writer finally sells his pirate movie-musical to a big studio.
Joe wants to use some of the money to remodel his classic
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4).
36. See THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF
THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD INTERIM REPORT
TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMIITEE ON CIVIL RULES 21 (2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CAFA Third Interim.pdf.; THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G.
LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PROGRESS REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES ON THE IMPACT OF CAFA ON THE FEDERAL COURTS (2007), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa 107.pdf/Sfile/cafa 1107.pdf.
37. See CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 426.30 to .60 (Deering 2008).
38. See id. §§ 428.10 to .70.
39. See id.
40. Scott Paetty, Developments, Classless Not Clueless: A Comparison of Case
Management Mechanisms for Non-Class-Based Complex Litigation in California and Federal
Courts, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 845 (2008).
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craftsman into the swanky pad he has always wanted by
adding a second story, a pool, and a guesthouse,
reconfiguring the backyard to resemble the tropical gardens
that formed the scene of his franchise epic. Total cost of
the remodel: almost two million dollars.
Joe engages Build Your Dreams Affiliates ("BYDA")
to plan and execute the project. BYDA spins the job to
Build Your Dreams, Inc. ("BYD"), a general contractor
sub-entity of BYDA that hires all of the architects and
related subcontractors to draw up the plans and complete
the work. After two years of delays, cost overruns, and
faulty construction, Joe severs his relationship with BYDA.
He then files suit for breach of contract, fraud,
misrepresentation, negligence, and other claims centering
on BYDA's alleged bad faith. BYDA in turn files cross-
claims against Joe Writer and all of the subcontractors
(including the architects, door manufacturers, marble
importers, air conditioning and electric companies, pool and
plumbing companies, landscapers, roofers, tile installers,
and the bank that Joe used to co-finance the venture).
The third-party defendant subcontractors in turn file
counterclaims against BYDA asserting that BYD was
inadequately capitalized and bonded for the work that it
was supposed to do and that BYD was essentially a sham
corporation designed to avoid liability.
Joe Writer files his suit against BYDA in California
State court. California permits litigants to designate certain
types of cases as complex4' by checking the complex case
box on the civil cover sheet." Assuming Joe checks the
complex box, will the presiding judge agree or initially
41. "A 'complex case' is an action that requires exceptional judicial management to avoid
placing unnecessary burdens on the court or the litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs
reasonable, and promote effective decision making by the court, the parties, and counsel." CAL.
R. CT. 3.400(a). Except as provided in CAL. R. CT. 3.400(d), an action is provisionally a complex
case if it involves one or more of the following types of claims: antitrust or trade regulation
claims; construction defect claims involving many parties or structures; securities claims or
investment losses involving many parties; environmental or toxic tort claims involving many
parties; claims involving mass torts; claims involving class actions; or insurance coverage claims
arising out of any of the claims listed above. CAL. R. CT. 3.400(c).
42. Cal. Jud. Council Form CM-010.
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deny complex status?43 As originally filed, this set of
hypothetical facts would be atypical of cases deemed
complex. Although it might appear to fit neatly into the
construction defect provisional complex category, the initial
claim is only between one plaintiff and one defendant.
Once BYDA joins the subcontractors and the cross claims
begin flying, however, the case is more likely to be
designated complex and be subject to California's complex
court system ("CCCS") procedures.
What other tools can the California courts use to
efficiently resolve complex or multiparty litigation?
Consolidation" and coordination45 are two tools similar to
those used by the federal courts.46 For example, assuming
that Joe Writer files his claims against BYDA in Los
Angeles Superior Court and BYDA simultaneously files its
claims against Writer in a separate suit there, these two
cases will be ideal candidates for consolidation because this
procedural device is appropriate when all related actions are
filed in the same court. However, if the roofing company
and the tile company were based in San Francisco and these
companies chose to file their claims against BYDA and the
other subcontractors in San Francisco Superior court, then
the related cases may possibly be coordinated.
Coordination is the appropriate tool to use when related
actions are filed in different courts within California.
If Joe Writer's claims, the cross-claims, and the third
party claims result in consolidation or coordination, one
43. In deciding whether an action is a complex case under CAL. R. CT. 3.400(a), the court
must consider, among other things, whether the action is likely to involve: numerous pretrial
motions raising difficult or novel legal issues that will be time-consuming to resolve;
management of a large number of witnesses or a substantial amount of documentary evidence;
management of a large number of separately represented parties; coordination with related actions
pending in one or more courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court; or
substantial post-judgment judicial supervision. CAL. R. CT. 3.400(b).
44. See CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1048 (Deering 2008).
45. See id. § 404.
46. For example, the Federal Rules allow for consolidation of cases in one district if the
cases involve common questions of law or fact, and 28 U.S.C. § 1407 allows for transfer of cases
from any district court to one district court for coordinated pretrial proceedings. Additionally,
when the statutory factors are met, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) can be used to transfer a case or cases
from one district court to another, where they can then be consolidated under Rule 42.
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judge will have an undeniably complex case, whether
designated as such or not. Additionally, the hypothetical
Writer v. BYDA case and claims will involve the need for
expert evidence like much modem litigation, whether in
state or federal court. For example, Joe Builder and BYDA
will likely have expert witnesses set for depositions on each
of the claims involved. Moreover, each of the
subcontractors, the architects, and even the bank will
certainly add their experts to the mix as well. Now add to
this confusion the motions to compel and suppress that will
inevitably be filed by attorneys for each of the parties, and
it becomes readily apparent that judicial resources will be
stretched to their limit. And this action is only focused on a
single family residential improvement. Imagine if the
construction defect claim involved a hundred unit
condominium or a commercial development with even
more parties involved. In federal courts, special masters are
routinely used to help the court work with the parties and
deal with discovery issues and experts. At what point, if
ever, will the California courts employ special masters to
help resolve the ever-increasing complex litigation?
As discovery proceeds in our hypothetical case,
assume that it is revealed that BYDA, in its dealings with
the subcontractors, implemented a series of change orders
pertaining to the work on Joe Writer's house. For example,
BYDA instructs the plumbing company to use PVC piping
instead of copper to save costs and instructs the tile
company to use slate instead of marble for the same reason.
Now imagine that Joe Writer's fraud claim against BYDA
is based on thirty of these change orders. Under the current
summary judgment rule governing the CCCS, can the court
streamline the proceedings by dispensing with any meritless
assertions regarding the change orders? California does not
allow summary adjudication of individual factual issues
that dispose of only part of a cause of action. On the other
hand, under the federal standard for partial summary
judgment, the court could eliminate the baseless assertions
regarding the change orders from Joe's fraud claim.
Spring 2008]
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Mr. Paetty concludes his article by comparing the California and
federal complex litigation systems, arguing that although the CCCS
system can be improved, it is innovative and has the potential for
becoming a model for other states.
IV. COMPLEX LITIGATION APPROACHES OF OTHER STATES
The next article, by Adam Feit, explores developments in other
states." His focus is on "tort reform" and other state court
developments designed to eliminate wasteful practices and improve
the administration of justice in class actions and other types of
complex and high stakes litigation. Thus far, this Developments
issue has focused on California and comparisons of California
procedures with federal procedures. But, as we all know, forum
selection goes beyond the state-federal battle. Often, plaintiffs'
attorneys might prefer to litigate in a particular state because of
favorable jury verdicts and/or substantive or procedural law. As
discussed above, it is possible to keep a class action in state court
under the mandatory exception from CAFA jurisdiction when a class
is composed mainly of citizens of the forum state. But, many
consumer cases involve citizens of all fifty states. Consider the
following hypothetical:
Suppose a woman purchases a laptop computer from
Great Goods, a major national electronic retailer
headquartered in Illinois. The sales clerk recommends a
"special" warranty that covers all costs of inspection, repair,
or replacement should the laptop malfunction in any way.
Erring on the side of caution, the woman agrees and buys
the "special" warranty. In fact, almost all customers buy
the "special" warranty for their laptops.
Within a year, the laptop begins to malfunction. The
woman brings it to the service department at her local Great
Goods. The service department accepts her laptop and
charges her a $5 inspection fee, which she doesn't question.
After a week, the woman inquires about the status of her
laptop. She is told there is no record of the laptop in their
47. Adam Feit, Developments, Tort Reform, One State at a Time: Recent Developments in
Class Actions and Complex Litigation in New York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 899 (2008).
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system. The laptop has disappeared. Now irate, the woman
insists on a formal investigation and fair compensation for
the replacement of her laptop. Great Goods responds by
offering her a $900 gift card, which she finds ridiculous.
Not only are her lost files invaluable, but compensation in
the form of a gift card would require her to buy another
computer from Great Goods, something she refuses to do.
Thinking it would be too expensive to hire an attorney
to sue Great Goods, the woman instead starts a blog to
showcase her frustrating experiences. The blog
unexpectedly becomes very popular. Hundreds of people
visit the site and post their own horror stories from dealing
with Great Goods' customer service. Eventually, a
plaintiffs' attorney notices the blog and reads the stories.
He notices a pattern of rude customer service, lost laptops,
and the mysterious $5 inspection fee, which contradicts
Great Good's claim that the "special" warranty covers all
costs incident to inspection and repair.
Suppose the plaintiffs' attorney decides to bring a
consumer class action against Great Goods for fraudulently
charging the $5 inspection fee. She has read about the
plaintiff-friendly "judicial hellholes" of Illinois, Florida,
and Texas and envisions the large attorneys' fees that can
be generated by representing a nationwide class in a state
court. In which state should she file the action? How will
the pleading requirements in different states affect her
chances of class certification? Will she be able to add
individual plaintiffs' claims for their lost laptops without
destroying the prerequisites for certification? Will state
courts still certify a nationwide class? Would it be
advantageous to file single-state class actions, to lessen the
chances of Great Goods removing the suits to federal
courts?
On the other hand, suppose Great Goods has spent
millions of dollars over the years defending and settling
class actions in its home state of Illinois. If Great Goods
decides to close all their Illinois factories and move their
corporate headquarters to another state with a more
hospitable legal climate, which state should they choose?
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Maybe Great Goods routinely finds itself engaged in
complex commercial disputes with its distributors and
contractors, and often takes advantage of the benefits of a
specialized "business court." Can they find another state
with either a "business court" or similarly effective
approaches to complex litigation? Does the passage of
recent tort reform legislation make Texas or Florida an
attractive option? Can Great Goods move to a state that
efficiently handles complex litigation and has heightened
pleading requirements that could insulate Great Goods from
tort and class action liability?
Mr. Feit's article addresses all these questions and will provide
plaintiffs' attorneys and defense attorneys with food for thought
about what questions to ask about these states as well as others, and
how to approach the multifaceted forum selection problem in
complex cases.
V. CONSUMER CLASS AND MASS ACTIONS:
THE ULTIMATE FORUM SELECTION BATTLE
Our next article, by Nicole Ochi, zeros in on consumer class
actions and mass actions, the bane of corporate America's existence,
and whether recent federal legislation designed to steer all or most of
such cases to federal court and out of state courts has affected the
forum selection battle.48 Her article deals with the questions raised
by this hypothetical:
A catastrophic earthquake pummels Southern
California in late July and kills hundreds of people. Many
of the main water lines are rendered ineffective by the
impact, and fires break out in the aftermath. At the USC
County Hospital, hundreds of indigent patients are trapped
by the fires without recourse: the internal sprinkler system
is not functional, the exits are barred, and there is no
evacuation plan. Despite rescue efforts, thirty-five patients
remain trapped in the facility and pass away.
Subsequently, various patients and relatives of
deceased and allegedly injured plaintiffs file a class action
48. Nicole Ochi, Developments, Are Consumer Class and Mass Actions Dead? Complex
Litigation Strategies After CAFA and MMTJA, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 965 (2008).
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in Los Angeles County Superior Court against the hospital,
alleging negligence for its failure to create and/or
implement an evacuation plan and keep its emergency
sprinkler system operable. The hospital removes the case to
federal court under the federal Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act (MMTJA) and the Class Action Fairness
Act (CAFA).
Defendant argues that federal court jurisdiction is
proper under MMTJA because the earthquake is an
"accident" and more than seventy-five deaths occurred in
the metro Los Angeles area. What will the United States
District Court for the Central District of California do if the
plaintiffs seek a remand to California court? Will the
district court reject jurisdiction under MMTJA because a
natural disaster is not an accident under the statute? Even if
each fire caused by the earthquake may be construed as an
accident, will metro Los Angeles be deemed a discrete
location? Although the hospital is a discrete location, the
threshold number of deaths did not occur at the hospital
(only thirty-five deaths in the hospital instead of the
requisite seventy-five). Therefore, MMTJA may not confer
federal jurisdiction over the action.
In the alternative, defendant argues that federal court
jurisdiction is proper under CAFA because the defendant is
a California citizen, at least one of the patients is a citizen
of a state other than California, and the amount in
controversy for thirty-five wrongful death suits and
hundreds of personal injury cases substantially exceeds $5
million.
Plaintiff moves to remand by arguing that one of the
CAFA exceptions apply because at least two-thirds of the
plaintiff class are citizens of California, the defendant is a
citizen of California, and the injuries occurred in California.
Plaintiff has the burden of proof, but the district court
requires the defendant to provide the addresses and phone
numbers of those patients who died at County during the
relevant time period, as well as phone numbers of the
patients' emergency contacts listed on their medical forms.
Of the thirty-five patients who died in the earthquake's
Spring 2008]
778 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.41:763
aftermath, only two provided addresses outside the state of
California. Additionally, an affidavit by County's medical
records supervisor attests that less than 3 percent of the total
patient population indicated that they were residents of
other states.
The plaintiffs' attorney also hires a private investigator
to trace the mailing addresses of 146 individuals that are
potential class members. Due to the destruction across
Southern California, one-third of those contacted currently
reside outside of the state. However, eight plaintiffs living
out of state submit affidavits suggesting that some displaced
class members intend to return to Los Angeles in the near
future when it is habitable.
What is the district court likely to rule? Will it find
that the plaintiffs have met their burden of proof and that
the local controversy and home state exceptions apply, thus
requiring a remand? If not, will the court decline to
exercise jurisdiction under the discretionary exception,
which applies when one-third to two-thirds of the class are
in-state citizens?
Specifically, the district court could find'a distinct
nexus between the forum of California, County Hospital,
and the proposed class. All of the defendant's actions took
place at County Hospital in Los Angeles, and most of the
claims involve issues of negligence that will be governed
by California law. The defendant is a California citizen,
and over 97 percent of the patients registered at the hospital
when the earthquake occurred provided information
indicating California residence. Most of those displaced by
the earthquake intend to return.
The answers to these technical, complex issues will drive forum
selection, and Ms. Ochi's article provides the litigation strategies
attorneys need to understand how to get complex cases into or out of
federal court.
VI. CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS: FILLING THE REGULATORY VOID
Having examined California complex litigation procedures,
complex litigation procedures of several other states, as well as the
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specifics of how recent federal legislation has affected the state-
federal forum selection battle of complex cases, Alec Johnson takes
us on a somewhat different tack: should consumer products be
regulated by courts at all?49 Or, should we limit courts' regulatory
power over consumer product claims?
A typical products litigation scenario provides the backdrop to
this discussion:
Fifteen years ago, Delfino Pharmaceuticals developed
a new drug, Nifflin, that helped manage high blood pressure
in middle-aged patients. Effective blood pressure
medications had already been on the market for many years,
including an older drug developed by Delfino, which had a
patent set to expire in a couple of years. One side effect of
these older medications, however, was a recurring dry
cough that developed in 10 percent of patients, often
resulting in these patients failing to take their medication on
a regular basis and hindering the long-term reduction of
their blood pressure. As these drugs were generally taken
by patients prone to high blood pressure for many years,
this seemingly small side effect had the potential to
significantly undermine treatment.
Delfino hailed Nifflin as a major advancement because
it reduced the rate of this side effect to less than 1 percent.
After five years of clinical studies to establish the
effectiveness of Nifflin and the associated rates of dry
cough, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
approved the drug for widespread use with a prescription.
Doctors quickly embraced the medication because it
significantly reduced the amount of follow-up previously
required to detect adverse reactions, as well as a potential
barrier to their patients taking the medication regularly.
After five years on the market, Nifflin became the most
widely prescribed high blood pressure medication in the
country and was regularly taken by over ten million
patients.
49. Alec Johnson, Developments, Vioxx and Consumer Product Pain Relief The Policy
Implications of Limiting Courts' Regulatory Influence over Mass Consumer Product Claims, 41
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1039 (2008).
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Just after Nifflin had first been approved by the FDA,
Delfino researchers noticed that several of the patients
involved in the initial clinical tests had developed
Alzheimer's disease. While the overall rate of Alzheimer's
in the study group was only slightly above the national
average at the time, some of the researchers voiced
concerns over the data because Alzheimer's can often take
many years to develop and detect. Despite these concerns,
officials at Delfino did not think that the data warranted a
sufficient issue to raise with the FDA, particularly since
Nifflin was rapidly becoming the company's most
profitable drug.
After ten years on the market, however, significant
anecdotal evidence of increased rates of Alzheimer's began
to emerge, and Delfino commissioned a study of a possible
link between long-term use of Nifflin and Alzheimer's.
After a two-year study, the results established that patients
who regularly used Nifflin for more than a year were twice
as likely to develop Alzheimer's, even if they had stopped
taking the medication years prior to the onset of the disease.
The researchers estimated that 20 percent of patients who
had taken Nifflin, roughly two million people, would
develop Alzheimer's as a result of the drug.
After Delfino quickly pulled Nifflin from the market
following the study, the company faced a barrage of
lawsuits including class actions in both state and federal
courts. Despite the early warning signs of the drug's
potential connection to Alzheimer's, the company was able
to successfully defend itself against most of the individual
suits by arguing to juries that Alzheimer's rates were
advancing for many potential reasons and that identifying
the actual cause of such a little understood disease was
impossible. Further, courts were unwilling to grant class
certification because variations in patient history made
commonality impossible. Finally, Delfino also argued that
FDA approval of the drug pre-empted tort claims involving
the safety of the drug. The results have left two million
potential plaintiffs suffering from Alzheimer's with little
remedy.
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Mr. Johnson's article traces the recent trends in complex
litigation, such as the declining possibility of class certification in
mass tort cases, which reduces plaintiffs' bargaining power.
Nonetheless, even with the class action ax removed, corporate
defendants worry about the slow bleed caused when hundreds or
hundreds of thousands of individual cases remain unresolved on the
merits. Pressure therefore remains on defendants to obtain global
peace, or at least near global peace. And so, as seen recently in the
Vioxx litigation, large settlements are still possible. The Vioxx
settlement of over $4 billion" seems large, but some have criticized
the ethics of the settlement5 as well as the amount.52 Mr. Johnson
analyzes the Vioxx litigation and argues that recent trends have
limited the power of courts to provide adequate relief, proposing an
expanded role of government involvement to ensure the safety of the
citizenry.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Developments issue tackles the problems raised by
complex litigation, particularly controversial forms of complex
litigation such as consumer class actions and mass tort litigation,
which have been driving the state-federal and state-state forum
selection battle for the last decade or so. The five articles deftly
handle the arcane, technical rules and statutes, the case law, and the
regulatory implications of such litigation. Whether a litigation ends
up in state or federal court, there is clearly a need for continued study
of how best to handle cases such as those raised in our hypotheticals
above and the articles to follow because how these cases are resolved
will effect us all as consumers in this increasingly dangerous world.
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